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planning matters during the Survey Period of November 1, 2012, through 
October 31, 2013. The reader is warned that not all newly enacted statutes and 
decided cases during the Survey Period are presented, and not all aspects of each 
cited statute and case are analyzed. You must read and study the full text of each 
statute and case before relying on it or using it as precedent. The discussion of 
most cases includes a moral, that is, the important lesson to be learned from the 
case. By recognizing situations that have resulted in time-consuming and costly 
litigation in the past, the reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of similar 
situations arising with his or her clients. 
I.  THE ESTATES CODE 
The 2009 legislature began the process of codifying the current Probate Code 
into the new Estates Code.1 Although called a “code,” the Probate Code is not a 
true “code” because it was enacted in 1955, which was before the 1963 
legislature began the process of codifying Texas law into twenty-seven codes. The 
codification process is supposed to be nonsubstantive.2 
The portion of the Estates Code passed by the 2009 legislature focused on 
intestacy, wills, and estate administration.3 The guardianship and durable power-
of-attorney provisions were added in 2011.4 “The 2011 legislature also made 
changes to the previously enacted portions of the Estates Code to be consistent 
with amendments it made to the existing Probate Code.”5 The 2013 legislature 
continued to fix issues with the 2009 and 2011 codifications as well as make 
substantive changes.6 The entire Estates Code became effective on January 1, 
2014.7 
II.  INTESTACY 
A.  CHILDREN FROM SURROGATE PARENTS 
Under prior law, for a person to be a child of his or her mother for intestacy 
purposes, the child must either be biologically related or adopted.8 When a 
surrogate mother is used, the child may not be biologically related or adopted, 
and thus the intended mother was not considered a mother for inheritance 
purposes, even though she was for family law purposes.9 Effective for the estates 
of individuals who die on or after January 1, 2014, the intended mother is the 
 
 1. Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 680, § 1, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1512. 
 2. Id. § 11, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1732. 
 3. See id. § 1, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1512. 
 4. See, e.g., Act of May 19, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 823, § 1.01, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1901, 
1901. 
 5. Gerry W. Beyer, Wills & Trusts, 66 SMU L. REV. 1219, 1220 (2013). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See, e.g., § 12, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1732. For charts to convert from the Probate Code 
to the Estates Code and from the Estates Code to the Probate Code, see 
http://www.professorbeyer.com/Estates_Code/Conversion_Charts_03-17-2014.pdf. 
 8. Act of May 17, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., Ch. 713, § 42, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1743, 1743, 
repealed by Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 680 § 10, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1512, 1731. 
 9. Id. 
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child’s mother for intestacy purposes.10 Likewise, the intended father will be 
considered to be the child’s father.11 
B.  DETERMINATION OF HEIRSHIP 
1.  Statute of Limitations 
The 2013 legislature added Estates Code section 202.0025 to make it clear 
that there is no statute of limitations to a proceeding to declare heirship of a 
decedent.12 Although the provision was effective on January 1, 2014, the 
legislature stated that this section is “intended to clarify current law” and that 
“an inference may not be made regarding the statute of limitations for a 
proceeding to declare heirship filed before the effective date.”13 
2.  Unsecured Creditors 
The 2013 legislature removed the restriction that only secured creditors could 
commence a proceeding to declare heirship.14 If a decedent dies on or after 
January 1, 2014, any creditor, unsecured or secured, may initiate an heirship 
proceeding.15 
3.  Attorneys Ad Litem 
Estates Code section 202.009 was amended to impose a mandatory duty on 
the court to appoint an attorney ad litem in an heirship proceeding to represent 
the heirs whose names or locations are unknown.16 The court retains the 
discretion to appoint an attorney ad litem for an incapacitated heir.17 
4.  Citation 
Estates Code section 202.056 now provides that citation may be waived only 
for a minor distributee who is under twelve years old.18 If the minor is twelve or 
older, citation may not be waived.19 
5.  New Requirement 
A court cannot enter an order determining heirs unless the applicant files (1) 
a copy of the notice and proof of delivery sent to interested parties and (2) an 
affidavit of the applicant or a certificate signed by the applicant’s attorney stating 
that notice was given, the name of each person who received the notice if not 
shown on the proof, and the name of each person who waived citation.20 
 
 10. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 11, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2740. 
 11. Id. § 12, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2740. 
 12. Id. § 13, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2740–41. 
 13. Id. § 62(g), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2754. 
 14. Id. § 14, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2741. 
 15. Id. (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 202.004). 
 16. Id. § 15, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2741. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. § 16, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2741. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. § 17, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2741–42 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 202.057). 
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III.  WILLS 
A.  FORMALITIES 
A prudent attorney should have the testator and the witnesses initial each 
page of the will because this practice will make it easier to rebut claims of page 
substitution. For example, in the case of In re Estate of Pilkilton, a dispute arose 
whether pages of a properly executed will were replaced by different 
(“corrected”) pages at a later date.21 The Dallas Court of Appeals agreed with the 
trial court that the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that page 
substitution did not occur, especially because no one testified that the testator 
executed the will prior to all corrections being made.22 
B.  SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVITS 
The 2011 legislature amended Civil Practice & Remedies Code 
section 132.001 to permit the use of unsworn written affidavits made under 
penalty of perjury in lieu of written sworn affidavits.23 The 2013 legislature 
added a provision to Estates Code section 21.005 providing that this procedure 
is not applicable to self-proving affidavits on wills executed on or after January 1, 
2014.24 
C.  TITLE OF DEVISEE 
Meekins v. Wisnoski serves as a reminder that a beneficiary’s vested interest in 
the estate remains subject to the testator’s creditors, and thus a beneficiary may 
lose his or her entire bequest or devise.25 A beneficiary claimed that a receiver 
appointed to sell property of the testator’s estate could not sell his interest 
because of the well-established principle that the interest of a beneficiary vests 
immediately upon the testator’s death.26 The Houston Fourteenth Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument, explaining that once an executor is appointed, 
the executor “holds legal title and a superior right to possess [the] property” to 
pay the decedent’s debts.27 Thus, when the probate court appointed a receiver to 
partition and sell estate property to pay a tax debt and the sale properly took 
place, the purchaser received the testator’s interest in the property.28 
D.  COURT ORDERS RESTRICTING NEW WILLS 
A person may disregard without penalty or sanction any portion of a court 
order that attempts to prohibit a person from executing a new will or a codicil to 
 
 21. In re Estate of Pilkilton, No. 05-11-00246-CV, 2013 WL 485773, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
Feb. 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 22. Id. at *4. 
 23. Act of May 25, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 847, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 2119, 2119. 
 24. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2737–38. 
 25. Meekins v. Wisnoski, 404 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). 
 26. Id. at 697–98. 
 27. Id. at 698. 
 28. Id. 
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an existing will.29 This should reduce the practice of some family law lawyers 
who routinely include in their orders a mandate that the other spouse not 
change their testamentary plan during the pendency of the divorce. 
E.  FORFEITURE CLAUSES 
1.  Burden of Proof 
The 2013 legislature clarified the party who has the burden of proof with 
regard to the enforceability of forfeiture clauses. A forfeiture clause is presumed 
enforceable unless the party who wants the clause to be unenforceable 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that just cause existed for 
bringing the action and the action was brought and maintained in good faith.30 
2.  Strict Construction 
Courts strictly construe in terrorem provisions and are unlikely to enforce them 
when property disposition is not impacted by the lawsuit. For example, in Di 
Portanova v. Monroe, the trial court granted applicants’ request for eight trusts to 
be consolidated under the court’s deviation authority provided in Property Code 
section 112.054.31 The court explained that “[b]ecause of circumstances not 
known to or anticipated by the settlors, the original terms of the Eight Trusts 
would substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the Eight 
Trusts in ways [the settlors] could not have anticipated.”32 The consolidation did 
not impact the dispositive provisions of the trusts. 
The appellants asserted that the consolidation violated in terrorem will 
provisions which stated that forfeiture occurs if an action is brought “for the 
purpose of modifying, varying, setting aside or nullifying any provision hereof . . 
. on any ground whatsoever.”33 The Houston First Court of Appeals rejected 
this assertion, holding that the suit for judicial modification of administrative 
terms was not intended to thwart the testators’ intent and thus did not trigger 
forfeiture.34 In fact, the wills did not prohibit consolidation, and the 
consolidation would prevent waste and avoid impairment of the administration 
of the trust.35 
F.  INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION 
In Netherton v. Cowan, the testator’s will devised a beneficiary a remainder 
interest in certain real property, but if the beneficiary were to predecease the 
testator or die “before the property . . . vests in him,” the property would pass to 
an alternate beneficiary.36 The beneficiary died prior to the holder of the life 
 
 29. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 20, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2742. 
 30. Act of May 17, 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 351, §§ 1.01, 2.01, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1122. 
 31. Di Portanova v. Monroe, 402 S.W.3d 711, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no 
pet.). 
 32. Id. at 716. 
 33. Id. at 715. 
 34. Id. at 718–19. 
 35. Id. at 718. 
 36. Netherton v. Cowan, No. 04-12-00627-CV, 2013 WL 4091773, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—San 
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estate.37 When the life estate owner died, a dispute arose between the 
beneficiary’s estate and the alternate beneficiary over the ownership of the 
land.38 
Both the trial court and the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the 
property was part of the beneficiary’s estate.39 The court of appeals explained 
that Texas law favors a construction that results in vesting at the earliest possible 
time, and thus the remainder interest vested in the beneficiary immediately 
upon the testator’s death.40 In addition, the court noted that the testator’s will 
did not include language requiring the holder of the remainder interest to 
outlive the life tenant as a condition of the devise.41 
G.  CONTESTS 
1.  Statute of Limitations 
A person who believes a will is invalid must contest that will on a timely basis, 
or even meritorious claims will be lost. For example, in Omohundro v. Ramirez-
Justus, the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment because the 
suit was time-barred under Probate Code section 93 (two years from date of 
probate to contest a will subject to limited exceptions not applicable to this 
case).42 Accordingly, the court did not address any of the appellant’s substantives 
issues.43 
2.  Discharged Independent Executor as Proper Party to Contest 
In re Estate of Whittington teaches that an independent executor who obtains a 
judicial discharge is not a proper party to a subsequent contest of the will.44 The 
probate court admitted the testator’s will to probate and appointed an 
independent executor.45 After completing his duties, the independent executor 
obtained a judicial discharge under Probate Code section 149E (now Estates 
Code section 405.003).46 Approximately six months later, a contestant filed a 
will contest and had citation served upon the independent executor.47 The trial 
court granted the independent executor’s motion to be dismissed from the 
action on the ground that he was not a proper party due to the judicial 
discharge.48 Although the trial court originally imposed sanctions on the 
grounds that there was no existing law supporting why the independent executor 
 
Antonio Aug. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 37. Id. at *2. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at *4. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Omohundro v. Ramirez-Justus, 392 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. 
denied). 
 43. Id. 
 44. In re Estate of Whittington, 409 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.). 
 45. Id. at 667. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 668. 
 48. Id. 
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would be a proper party and that the argument to establish a new rule was 
frivolous, the court later reconsidered and denied sanctions.49 
The Eastland Court of Appeals agreed that the independent executor was not 
a proper party due to the judicial discharge.50 A judicial discharge is designed for 
the executor to “obtain a shield from any liability involving matters relating to 
the past administration of the estate that have been fully and fairly disclosed.”51 
In addition, it would be absurd to force the executor to defend the will with his 
or her own money after all of the estate assets have already been distributed and 
there is no guarantee that the beneficiaries have retained any of those assets for 
reimbursement purposes.52 The court also agreed that sanctions were not 
appropriate because this issue was a matter of first impression.53 
H.  TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE RIGHTS 
In re Estate of Valdez confirms that a will contestant cannot be held liable for 
tortious interference with inheritance rights.54 After proponent filed 
applications to probate the testatrix’s will, the contestant filed a will contest.55 
The proponent then attempted to hold the contestant liable for tortious 
interference with inheritance rights.56 The trial court granted the contestant a 
summary judgment.57 The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed.58 Citing 
Probate Code section 10C (now Estates Code section 54.001), the court 
explained that Contestant could not be held liable “because his lawful act of 
filing a will contest was not tortious conduct.”59 
IV.  ESTATE ADMINISTRATION 
A.  JURISDICTION 
Haga v. Thomas reminds us that Texas courts have jurisdiction regarding the 
administration of Texas real property regardless of where the will was admitted 
to probate.60 The decedent was a North Carolina resident at the time of his 
death.61 The beneficiary was successful in getting a court in North Carolina to 
admit the decedent’s will to probate.62 After the decedent’s parents had a Texas 
probate court admit the will to probate and construe how the will disposed of 
Texas real property, the beneficiary appealed, claiming that the North Carolina 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 673. 
 51. Id. at 670. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 673. 
 54. In re Estate of Valdez, 406 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). 
 55. Id. at 231. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 230. 
 59. Id. at 234. 
 60. Haga v. Thomas, 409 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. filed). 
 61. Id. at 732. 
 62. Id. at 733. 
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court had exclusive jurisdiction over the decedent’s will and the administration 
of his estate.63 
The Houston First Court of Appeals affirmed.64 The court began its analysis 
by examining Probate Code section 95(a), which allows a probated will from 
another state to be admitted to probate in Texas.65 However, the court pointed 
out that this section “does not address whether a Texas probate court has 
jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning the administration of an estate or the 
construction of a will of a decedent who died in another state and was domiciled 
in that other state, but who owned real property in Texas.”66 The court reviewed 
leading Texas cases and concluded that “the existence of real property in Texas 
gives Texas courts jurisdiction over an administration concerning that 
property.”67 
B.  STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO PROBATE WILL 
In re Estate of Allen demonstrates that Texas courts are “quite liberal in 
permitting a will to be offered as a muniment of title after the statute of 
limitations has expired upon the showing of an excuse by the proponent for 
failure to offer the will earlier.”68 A wife filed her husband’s will for probate as a 
muniment of title more than four years after his death.69 The will left his entire 
estate to his wife of over fifty-six years.70 The trial court admitted the will to 
probate under Probate Code section 73(a) after finding that the wife was not in 
default for failing to probate the will within the four-year period.71 The testator’s 
son appealed.72 
The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed.73 The court reviewed the facts, 
which showed that the wife had consulted an attorney shortly after her 
husband’s death.74 The attorney told her that she had the option of probating 
the will as a muniment of title or executing an affidavit of heirship and that 
regardless of which option she selected, she would receive the entire estate.75 
Because the wife wanted the estate handled quickly and inexpensively, she opted 
for the affidavit of heirship.76 
When the wife and the son had a dispute over keeping livestock on certain 
real property, the wife consulted a different attorney.77 This attorney discovered 
that her husband owned hundreds of acres of land as his separate property in 
 
 63. Id. at 733–35. 
 64. Id. at 738. 
 65. Id. at 736. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 737. 
 68. In re Estate of Allen, 407 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.). 
 69. Id. at 337. 
 70. Id. at 336–37. 
 71. Id. at 338. 
 72. Id. at 336. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 337. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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which his children would have a substantial interest under intestacy (e.g., two-
thirds outright plus a life estate in the wife’s life estate in the other one-third of 
the property).78 Within a month of learning of her children’s interest in the 
property under the affidavit of heirship, the wife filed the will for probate.79 
The court of appeals reviewed the evidence and found that it was sufficient to 
support the trial court’s finding that the wife was not in default.80 She relied on 
the advice of her attorney in not probating the will in a timely manner.81 She 
had no legal training and had no reason to distrust her attorney when he 
asserted that she would receive all of her husband’s property under an affidavit 
of heirship.82 Once she realized that her first attorney had given her bad advice, 
she promptly filed the will for probate.83 
C.  APPEAL 
Pine v. deBlieux demonstrates that in the gap period between the appellate 
court’s opinion and the court’s issuance of its mandate, a final judgment of a 
trial court is likely to be set aside if it conflicts with the opinion and mandate.84 
In a prior opinion, the Houston First Court of Appeals determined that the 
administratrix was unsuitable as a matter of law.85 The executrix sought review 
by the Texas Supreme Court, which denied her petition.86 The court of appeals 
then issued its mandate.87 However, in the interim, the trial court rendered a 
final judgment disposing of some of the decedent’s assets.88 
When the trial court’s action was brought to the attention of the court of 
appeals, the court of appeals held that the trial court should not have rendered a 
final judgment while the unsuitable administratrix was still in office.89 
Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s determination of the proper 
recipient of certain decedent’s assets.90 
The court recognized that Probate Code section 28 (now Estates Code 
section 351.053) allows the administratrix to continue to act and that Texas 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 18.6 provides that an interlocutory order takes 
effect when the mandate is issued.91 However, the court explained that the 
administratrix acted at her own peril when she continued to make claims to 
estate property hoping that the Texas Supreme Court would grant her petition 
and then find in her favor.92 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 341. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Pine v. deBlieux, 405 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). 
 85. Id. at 142. 
 86. Id. at 143 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 147. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 146. 
 92. Id. 
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D.  BILL OF REVIEW 
A party seeking an equitable bill of review must be certain to prove the 
required elements.93 For example, in the case of In re Estate of Aguilar, Son One 
probated his father’s will as a muniment of title.94 Seven months later, Son Two 
attempted to set aside the probate by filing an equitable bill of review (not a 
statutory bill of review under Probate Code section 31).95 Both the trial court 
and San Antonio Court of Appeals denied the application.96 
The court of appeals explained that to obtain an equitable bill of review, “the 
applicant must plead and prove: (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying 
cause of action, (2) which the applicant was prevented from making by the 
fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) 
unmixed with any fault or negligence on its own part.”97 
Son Two attempted to rely on a special situation where absence of service or 
lack of notice of the dispositive trial setting relieves the applicant from showing 
the normal elements for an equitable bill of review.98 The court rejected this 
argument because the evidence showed that Son One gave proper notice of the 
muniment of title action by posting as required by Probate Code section 128(a) 
(this notice also demonstrates that element two was not satisfied).99 
E.  ATTORNEY AD LITEM 
A probate court judge may now appoint an attorney ad litem for a broader 
range of individuals, including missing heirs and unknown or missing persons 
for whom cash was deposited into the court’s registry.100 In addition, the court 
must tax the attorney ad litem’s compensation as a cost of the probate and order 
that compensation to be paid out of the estate by any party, or, in the case of 
funds in the court’s registry, from those funds.101 
F.  APPLICATION FOR LETTERS TESTAMENTARY 
The requirements for the contents of an application for letters testamentary 
have changed. There are two key differences. First, the application must contain 
the state of residence and physical address where service can be had of the 
executor named in the will or the person to whom the applicant desires that 
letters be issued.102 Second, the application no longer needs to contain the 
addresses of the witnesses.103 
 
 93. See In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-12-00356-CV, 2013 WL 520282, at *2 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio Feb. 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 94. Id. at *9. 
 95. Id. at *1. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at *2. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 5, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3737, 2737–38 
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 53.104). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. § 22, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2742–43 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 256.052). 
 103. Id. 
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G.  PROOF OF FACTS 
The 2013 legislature added Estates Code section 301.155 to provide that any 
fact that must be provided, e.g., in applications for the issuance of letters, may 
be provided by live testimony, or if the witness is unavailable, “by deposition on 
written questions.”104 
H.  BOND 
A new provision, Estates Code section 305.004, addresses the procedure for 
bond in the few cases where bond is required.105 If the bond is timely filed, but 
the court fails to take timely action on the bond, the personal representative may 
file a motion for a hearing at which the judge must specify any objections to the 
bond on the record.106 
I.  EXECUTOR’S ABILITY TO RECOVER ESTATE PROPERTY 
Family members have a tendency to grab a decedent’s assets even if they have 
no authority to do so. The personal representative has a right to possession of all 
estate assets and a duty to acquire that possession.107 Obtaining a turnover order 
is one way for the personal representative to satisfy that duty, as In re Estate of 
Hutchins demonstrates.108 One of the testatrix’s children obtained possession of 
certain items of estate property without proper authority. The independent 
executrix filed a “Motion for Turnover Order” in her attempt to force the child 
to return the estate property.109 She based her request on Probate Code section 
37, which provides that the personal representative has “the right to possession 
of the estate as it existed at the death of the testator.”110 The trial court denied 
the turnover motion on the basis that the independent executrix was not a 
judgment creditor and thus could not use the turnover procedure provided in 
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 31.002.111 The independent 
executrix petitioned for a writ of mandamus.112 
The Dallas Court of Appeals granted mandamus.113 The court explained that 
the independent executrix was not seeking a turnover order under the Civil 
Practice and Remedies Code section 31.002.114 Instead, Independent Executrix 
was specifically requesting relief under Probate Code section 37, which gives the 
personal representative the right to possession of all estate property.115 
 
 104. Id. § 34, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2746. 
 105. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 305.004 (West 2014). 
 106. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 38, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2746–
47. 
 107. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 351.102 (West 2014). 
 108. In re Estate of Hutchins, 391 S.W.3d 578, 585 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). 
 109. Id. at 581. 
 110. Id. at 584 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37, TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001, 
101.003, 101.051). 
 111. See id. at 585. 
 112. Id. at 583. 
 113. Id. at 580. 
 114. Id. at 585. 
 115. Id. 
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The court made two other findings. First, a separate lawsuit under Probate 
Code section 233A, granting the personal representative the right to sue to 
recover estate property, is not necessary to recover estate property under Probate 
Code section 37.116 Second, even if an alleged family agreement actually existed, 
the personal representative is nonetheless entitled to possession of the estate as 
it existed on the date of death; the court found no case which concluded that 
section 37 is superseded by a family settlement agreement.117 
J.  PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
In re Estate of Arizola118 is instructive from two perspectives. First, the opinion 
indicates that strict compliance with the statutorily required contents for an 
application for letters may not be required.119 The applicant for letters of 
administration failed to list an heir in violation of Probate Code section 82(e).120 
The trial court nonetheless appointed the applicant.121 The San Antonio Court 
of Appeals held that this error did not lead to an improper judgment as the 
applicant was qualified and had a superior right to serve as the administrator.122 
Accordingly, the court held that the appointment was proper.123 
Second, although a dependent personal representative should usually seek 
prior court approval (permission) rather than take the action and then seek 
ratification (forgiveness), failure to do so is not necessarily a breach of duty.124 
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to remove an 
administrator for misapplication, waste, or embezzlement of estate assets under 
Probate Code section 222(a)(F) merely because he filed a motion seeking 
ratification of certain conduct.125 The court explained that although seeking 
prior court approval may be a better approach, failure to do so is not clear and 
convincing evidence of a misapplication or embezzlement.126 
K.  INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION 
1.  Consent Rules 
New rules govern the individuals who must consent to an independent 
administration if the decedent did not provide for one in his or her will. First, if 
the will contains a pour-over provision, the beneficiaries of the trust who receive 
property outright upon the decedent’s death must consent.127 Second, a minor’s 
natural guardian may consent to the appointment of a successor on the minor’s 
 
 116. Id. at 588. 
 117. Id. at 588–89. 
 118. In re Estate of Arizola, 401 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). 
 119. Id. at 670–71. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. at 667. 
 122. Id. at 671. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 673. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 51, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2750 
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 401.004). 
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behalf if there is no conflict of interest.128 Third, if the beneficiary of a 
testamentary trust is incapacitated, the trustee may file an application to 
continue the administration or consent for the beneficiary as long as the trustee 
is not the proposed successor.129 
2.  Removal 
The court may now remove an independent executor without notice in 
specified circumstances, such as if there are sufficient grounds to believe the 
executor has misapplied or embezzled estate property.130 In addition, removal is 
authorized with mere written notice by certified mail if the executor does not 
timely qualify or file the inventory or affidavit in lieu thereof.131 
3.  Distribution 
If the court becomes involved in the distribution of an estate being 
independently administered, the court is now permitted to order distribution of 
undivided interests in property if it is incapable of distribution without a prior 
partition or sale.132 
L.  CREDITORS 
The deadline for a creditor to submit a claim was changed from four months 
to 120 days, which could make a difference depending on the number of days in 
the relevant months (thirty-one day long months or the short month of 
February).133 
M.  INVENTORY 
1.  Use of Affidavit in Lieu of Inventory Expanded 
The typical language creating an independent administration provides, “I 
direct that no action be had in any court other than the probating of this will 
and the filing of an inventory, appraisement, and list of claims.” This language 
could be interpreted as requiring the filing of the inventory. The 2013 
legislature made it clear that the affidavit in lieu of inventory option is available 
even if the will requires the filing of inventory, as long as the will does not 
specifically prohibit the filing of an affidavit in lieu of inventory.134 In addition, 
the amendment added the word “required” before “inventory” in the statutory 
language typically included in a will to create an independent administration to 
reduce this problem further.135 
 
 128. Id. § 57, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2753 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 404.005). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. § 56, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2752–53 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 404.003 
and adding §§ 404.0035, 404.0036, & 404.0037). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. § 58, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2753 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 405.001). 
 133. Id. §§ 39, 45, & 53, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2747, 2749, & 2751 (amending TEX. EST. 
CODE ANN. §§ 308.054, 355.060, & 403.055). 
 134. Id. § 41, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2747–48 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 309.056). 
 135. Id. 
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2.  Liability Protection 
An executor cannot be held liable for the executor’s decision to file either a 
traditional inventory or the affidavit in lieu of inventory.136 
3.  Remedies 
A person dissatisfied with an affidavit in lieu of inventory now has the same 
potential remedies as a person dissatisfied with a traditional inventory.137 
4.  Penalty for Failure to File 
The legislature added Estates Code section 309.057 to allow the court to 
impose a fine, not to exceed $1,000, on any personal representative who does 
not file an inventory (or affidavit in lieu of inventory) after being cited for failing 
to do so.138 
5.  Successor Personal Representative 
A successor personal representative only needs to file an inventory listing the 
undistributed assets remaining on the date of the successor’s qualification if the 
previous representative had already filed an inventory.139 
N.  EXEMPT PROPERTY 
1.  Homestead 
The homestead will be protected from most creditors only if the decedent was 
survived by a person entitled to claim homestead occupancy rights, that is, a 
spouse or minor child.140 
2.  Allowances 
The allowance in lieu of homestead was raised to $45,000 from $15,000.141 
The allowance for other exempt property was raised to $30,000 from $5,000.142 
3.  Family Allowance 
A family allowance will not be available for an adult incapacitated child if the 
decedent was not supporting the child at the time of the decedent’s death.143 
 
 136. Id. (adding TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 309.056(d)). 
 137. Id. § 43, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2748 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 309.103). 
 138. Id. § 42, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2748. 
 139. Id. § 46, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2749 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 361.155). 
 140. Id. § 8, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2739 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 102.004). 
 141. Act of June 14, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 647, § 1.01, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1732, 1732 
(amending TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 273) & § 2.01, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1733 (amending TEX. 
EST. CODE ANN. § 353.053). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 44, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2748–49 
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 353.101). 
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O.  BANK ACCOUNT RECOVERY 
Coffey v. Bank of America teaches that an executor who wishes to claim that a 
decedent’s checks were not properly payable must act promptly to provide 
detailed notice to the financial institution.144 In addition, the executor must 
remember that survivorship, trust, and pay-on-death accounts are nonprobate 
assets and that the new owner of the account should bring any claims associated 
with the account.145 In Coffey, after the depositor died, the executrix claimed 
that the bank paid checks that were not properly payable and thus the estate 
should recover the amounts of those checks.146 Both the trial court and 
Beaumont Court of Appeals rejected the executrix’s claims on a variety of 
grounds based on the Uniform Commercial Code.147 
The account at issue was a pay-on-death account. The bank proved that it 
provided monthly statements to the depositor and, after the depositor’s death, 
to the pay-on-death payee.148 Because they did not report the alleged 
unauthorized transactions within sixty days (the statutory one-year period having 
been shortened by contract), it was too late to recover from the bank.149 Besides, 
the account was a nonprobate asset and not in the depositor’s estate.150 
The court of appeals pointed to Jefferson State Bank v. Lenk151 as support for 
Executrix’s claim that the time period did not actually begin to run until the 
executrix was appointed.152 The court held that even if this were the case, the 
executrix did not report the allegedly improper transactions to the bank until 
after the time period had run.153 The court explained that merely filing a lawsuit 
within that time was insufficient, as the pleading did not specifically identify the 
checks at issue.154 
P.  POWER OF SALE 
Estates Code section 401.006 was clarified to make clear that a court may 
grant a power of sale over personal property, as well as real property, if the court 
authorizes the independent personal representative to sell property, even though 
the will failed to grant a power of sale.155 
Q.  FINAL ACCOUNT 
The personal representative must now provide a copy of the final account to 
 
 144. Coffey v. Bank of America, No. 09-12-0013-CV, 2013 WL 257363, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Jan. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 145. See id. at *6. 
 146. Id. at *1. 
 147. Id. at *7. 
 148. Id. at *3. 
 149. Id. at *7. 
 150. See id. at *4. 
 151. Jefferson State Bank v. Lenk, 323 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. 2010). 
 152. Coffey, 2013 WL 257363, at *4. 
 153. Id. at *7. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Act of May 21, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, § 52, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2737, 2750–51 
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 401.006). 
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everyone entitled to citation on the final account and thereafter file an affidavit 
(or attorney’s certificate) listing details, including the names of these individuals 
and that each of them was provided with a copy of the final account.156 
R.  REGISTRY OF THE COURT 
Property passing to an unknown or missing person may be turned over to the 
court’s registry. This causes a problem because a court is ill-equipped to store 
grandmother’s china and dad’s lawnmower. The court is now required to order 
the representative to convert all the assets to cash and then deposit the cash.157 
This procedure, however, could cause irreparable loss of family heirlooms. 
S.  ATTORNEY FEES 
1.  Fees Denied—Late Request 
A party to a probate dispute who wishes to recover attorney’s fees should 
request them in the original complaint or answer, or as shortly thereafter as 
possible. Kirkland v. Schaff shows what happens if this advice is not followed.158 
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the probate court erred in allowing a trial 
amendment to request attorney’s fees under Probate Code section 245.159 The 
probate court had already issued a final order removing the administrator from 
office.160 Accordingly, “the probate court abused its discretion by granting the 
trial amendment and awarding appellees attorney’s fees after the probate court’s 
final order removing appellant as administrator was signed.”161 
2.  Fees Denied—Not in Estate’s Best Interest 
An executor should have an actual basis in fact before seeking to recover 
estate property. If an executor makes wild and unsupported accusations that 
then trigger attorney’s fees, the court is unlikely to permit the recovery of those 
fees from the estate, as in the case of In re Estate of Bessire.162 A son was 
appointed as the independent executor of his mother’s estate. The son later 
accused the mother’s daughter (his sister) of improperly taking money from their 
mother’s estate before she died.163 Extensive discovery proceedings and legal 
maneuvering subsequently occurred, resulting in the son being removed as the 
executor and the daughter being appointed in his place.164 In addition, the son 
was denied his attorney’s fees, which amounted to over $80,000.165 The son 
appealed.166 
 
 156. Id. § 47, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2749 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 362.005). 
 157. Id. § 48, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2750 (amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 362.011). 
 158. Kirkland v. Schaff, 391 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). 
 159. Id. at 655. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. In re Estate of Bessire, 399 S.W.3d 642, 650 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. denied). 
 163. Id. at 644. 
 164. Id. at 646. 
 165. Id. at 645–46. 
 166. Id. at 645. 
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The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed.167 After writing extensively on the 
procedural aspects of the claim, the court focused on whether the evidence 
supported a legal theory justifying the trial court’s denial of the son’s attorney’s 
fees.168 The court began its analysis by recognizing that the son was a fiduciary 
and was charged with collecting estate property under Probate Code 
section 233.169 However, this duty must be exercised with reasonable care.170 
The court examined the evidence, which revealed that the son actually admitted 
that he had no basis for his claim that the daughter had taken estate property.171 
Accordingly, the son’s attorney’s fees were not expended in the best interest of 
the estate and should not be paid out of estate funds under Probate Code 
section 242.172 The court explained that “when the personal representative’s 
own omission or malfeasance is at the root of the litigation, the estate will not 
be required to reimburse the personal representative for his attorney’s fees.”173 
V.  TRUSTS 
A.  VENUE 
The legislature made changes to the venue provisions for trust actions when 
there are multiple trustees.174 These sections need to be carefully studied to 
ascertain proper venue. Note that the sections may be in conflict if there are 
multiple noncorporate trustees plus at least one corporate trustee. 
B.  DEFINITION OF “PROPERTY” 
The “property” definition now expressly includes “property held in any digital 
or electronic medium.”175 
C.  SPENDTHRIFT PROTECTION 
A settlor will not be considered a beneficiary of a trust merely because the 
settlor’s interest in the trust was created by the exercise of a power of 
appointment by a third party.176 Likewise, property contributed to a laundry list 
of trusts will not be considered to have been contributed by the settlor.177 These 
changes help trusts retain spendthrift protection by assuring that the settlor is 
not treated as a beneficiary. 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 647. 
 169. Id. at 649–50. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Act of May 20, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 699, § 5, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1807, 1813 
(amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. ANN. § 115.002). 
 175. Id. § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1807 (amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004). 
 176. Id. § 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1807–08 (amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035). 
 177. Id. 
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D.  DISCOVERY 
In re Paschall warns that an inter vivos trust may not be as private as once 
believed because even remote claims to the trust property may result in the trust 
instrument being discoverable.178 The testatrix died with a will leaving her entire 
estate to the trustee of her inter vivos trust.179 Seven years later, a dispute arose 
regarding the validity of the will and thus the passage of the estate under the 
trust.180 Distant intestate heirs (first cousins, twice removed) were successful in 
getting the trial court judge to order the production of the trust instrument.181 
The executor sought a writ of mandamus asserting that the contestants lacked 
standing.182 
The Waco Court of Appeals denied the writ.183 The court explained that the 
contestants have a contingent pecuniary interest in the estate, that is, if they are 
successful in setting aside the will and proving they are the intestate heirs, they 
would be entitled to the property that is now being held in the testatrix’s 
trust.184 Accordingly, they have standing to seek discovery of the trust 
instrument.185 
E.  FORFEITURE CLAUSES 
The legislature made a parallel change to Property Code section 112.038 to 
be consistent with the changes discussed above which were made to the Probate 
and Estates Codes.186 
F.  DECANTING 
Texas has joined the growing number of states which have statutes granting 
the trustee the power to decant, that is, to distribute trust principal to another 
trust for the benefit of one or more of the beneficiaries of the original trust 
under specified circumstances.187 These provisions are lengthy and highly 
complex.188 
G.  PURCHASE OF INSURANCE 
A corporate trustee may now purchase insurance underwritten or distributed 
by an affiliate unless the settlor expressly prohibited doing so in the trust.189 
 
 178. In re Paschall, No. 10-12-00339-CV, 2013 WL 474368, at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 7, 
2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at *1. 
 181. Id. at *2. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at *1. 
 184. Id. at *7. 
 185. See id. 
 186. Act of May 17, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 351, § 3.01, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1122. 
 187. Act of May 20, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 699, § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1807, 1808 
(adding Subchapter D to TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. Chapter 112). 
 188. See Melissa Willems, Decanting Trusts: Irrevocable, Not Unchangeable, 6 EST. PLAN. & COMM. 
PROP. L.J. 35 (2014). 
 189. Act of May 23, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1337, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3549, 3549 
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H.  ALLOCATION OF TRUSTEE COMPENSATION 
Rather than being required to allocate trustee compensation equally between 
income and principal, the trustee may now allocate in any manner as long as it is 
consistent with the trustee’s fiduciary duties.190 
I.  ARBITRATION 
In the landmark case of Rachal v. Reitz, the Texas Supreme Court held that an 
arbitration clause in a trust is enforceable.191 A beneficiary brought suit asserting 
that the trustee misappropriated trust property and failed to provide a proper 
accounting.192 Because the settlor included a provision in his inter vivos trust 
requiring the beneficiaries to arbitrate any dispute with the trustees, the trustee 
moved to compel arbitration.193 Both the trial court and the Dallas Court of 
Appeals held that this provision was unenforceable.194 The court of appeals 
explained that a person cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute if the person 
did not agree to relinquish the person’s ordinary right to litigate.195 The 
beneficiary is merely a recipient of equitable title to property and not a party to 
the trust instrument.196 A trust is a conveyance of property coupled with a split 
of legal and equitable title and the imposition of fiduciary duties on the 
trustee.197 A trust is not an agreement or contract.198 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration provision is 
enforceable against the beneficiaries for two reasons.199 First, the court will 
enforce conditions the settlor attached to the gifts to carry out the settlor’s 
intent.200 The settlor included a clear statement that he wanted all disputes to be 
arbitrated and thus the court will give effect to that provision.201 
Second, the Texas Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate.202 Even though the beneficiaries did not expressly agree, they are 
deemed to have agreed through the doctrine of “direct benefits estoppel” 
because they accepted benefits of the trust and filed suit to enforce the terms of 
the trust.203 These actions are the assent required to form an enforceable 
arbitration agreement.204 If a beneficiary is unhappy with the arbitration 
 
(amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.053). 
 190. Id. §§ 2 & 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3549–50 (amending TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 
116.201 & 116.202). 
 191. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. 2013). 
 192. Id. at 842. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. granted). 
 195. Id. at 310–11. 
 196. Id. at 310. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. 2013). 
 200. Id. at 844. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 845. 
 203. Id. at 846–47. 
 204. Id. at 845–46. 
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provision, the beneficiary may disclaim under Trust Code section 112.010.205 
The supreme court stated that “it would be incongruent to allow a beneficiary to 
hold a trustee to the terms of the trust but not hold the beneficiary to those 
same terms.”206 
This case raises the following issue and concerns: 
• Although this was a trusts case, it would seem likely the court would 
reach the same result if the arbitration provision was contained in a 
will. 
• Although beneficiaries do have the ability to disclaim before 
accepting benefits, it is unlikely that beneficiaries read the trust and 
seek legal advice about the consequences of accepting benefits. 
Instead, beneficiaries just collect the benefits and study the trust 
instrument in detail only when something goes wrong. 
• The supreme court does not discuss how to handle the situation 
where the beneficiaries are minors or incompetent individuals. 
• Arbitration provisions may become boilerplate so that the 
justification that the settlor intentionally imposed the requirement 
may be problematic. 
• If a settlor really wanted to mandate arbitration, the settlor could 
include a provision requiring the trustee to obtain the beneficiary’s 
written consent to arbitrate as a condition precedent to receiving 
trust distributions. 
J.  BANKRUPTCY 
The Supreme Court of the United States case of Bullock v. BankChampaign 
teaches that a bankrupt trustee who breaches fiduciary duties, but not in an evil 
manner, may be successful in getting a judgment based on that breach 
discharged.207 The settlor created a trust for his children and named one of the 
children as the trustee.208 The trustee breached his fiduciary duties by borrowing 
funds from the trust, and thus his siblings obtained a judgment against him for 
the benefits he received from his self-dealing.209 The trustee had previously 
repaid all borrowed funds with interest, and the trial court determined that he 
had no malicious motive.210 The trustee later filed for bankruptcy and sought 
discharge of the judgment.211 The Bankruptcy Court held that the debt was not 
dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(4), which provides that discharge 
is not available “as a debt for defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.”212 
Both the Federal District Court and the Eleventh Circuit agreed.213 
 
 205. Id. at 846. 
 206. Id. at 847. 
 207. Bullock v. BankChampaign, 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013). 
 208. Id. at 1757. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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 212. Id. at 1755. 
 213. Id. at 1755–56. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed.214 The Court 
explained that the debt could be discharged because the trustee was not (in this 
author’s words) “evil.”215 The Court held that for the debt to be non-
dischargeable, the trustee must have acted with a culpable state of mind 
“involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature 
of the fiduciary behavior.”216 
K.  RECEIVERSHIP 
It is well accepted that receivership is an “extreme” remedy and will be 
granted “only where great emergency or imperative necessity requires it.”217 
Elliott v. Weatherman demonstrates this principle in a case where after the settlors 
died, their three children became co-trustees of their trust.218 Two of the trustees 
sued the third trustee alleging that he had violated the terms of the trust, 
breached fiduciary duties, and converted some of the trust property.219 To 
resolve this dispute, the trial court appointed a receiver upon the request of the 
allegedly breaching trustee over certain assets of the trust as authorized by Trust 
Code section 114.008(a)(5).220 The other two trustees appealed.221 
The Austin Court of Appeals reversed.222 The court stated that “[e]ven if a 
specific statutory provision authorizes a receivership, a trial court should not 
appoint a receiver if another remedy exists at law or in equity that is adequate 
and complete.”223 The court also explained that the two other trustees did not 
have sufficient notice that the receivership remedy was requested, that is, a 
minimum of three days’ notice under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 695 
because real property was involved.224 Even with respect to the personal property 
subject to the receivership, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to 
justify the appointment of a receiver without notice and the opportunity to be 
heard.225 
VI.  OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS 
A.  DISCLAIMERS 
As of January 1, 2014, an heir or will beneficiary will no longer be able to 
disclaim property if that person is in arrears in paying child support.226 Every 
 
 214. Id. at 1761. 
 215. See id. at 1759. 
 216. Id. at 1757. 
 217. Krummnow v. Krummnow, 174 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied). 
 218. Elliott v. Weatherman, 396 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). 
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 220. Id. at 227–28. 
 221. Id. at 229. 
 222. Id. at 225. 
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 224. Id. at 229. 
 225. Id. at 229–30. 
 226. Act of May 22, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 689, §§ 1 & 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1790, 1790 
(amending TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 122.051 and adding § 122.107). 
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disclaimant must state in the disclaimer whether the beneficiary is a child 
support obligor.227 Note that trust beneficiaries may still disclaim to avoid their 
child support obligations because the legislature did not make changes to the 
disclaimer provisions of the Trust Code.228 
B.  DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
Several changes were made to the statutory durable power of attorney form 
provided in Estates Code section 752.051: (1) adding a more detailed 
explanation in the instructions section on how a power of attorney operates, (2) 
requiring the principal to initial in front of powers to be granted (rather than 
crossing out powers the principal does not desire to grant), (3) including the 
exercise of a general power of appointment if the principal initials the gifting 
power, and (4) adding a comprehensive explanation of the agent’s duties.229 
A statutory probate court will have jurisdiction of actions brought by an agent 
under a power of attorney arising out of the agent’s performance of the agent’s 
duties as of January 1, 2014.230 Previously, the statutory probate court’s 
jurisdiction extended only to actions against the agent.231 
C.  MEDICAL POWER OF ATTORNEY 
The statutory form for the medical power of attorney was revised to reflect 
changes made in 2009 permitting the principal to have the power acknowledged 
before a notary rather than having it witnessed.232 
If a county has a statutory probate court, it now has concurrent jurisdiction 
with the district court over actions to set aside the power due to the principal’s 
lack of competency or being under duress, fraud, or undue influence.233 
D.  LIFE INSURANCE 
Upon divorce (or even while the divorce is pending), life insurance 
beneficiary designations need to be updated to reflect the insured’s intent 
because policies governed by federal law will not get the benefit of state law, 
which typically automatically voids a beneficiary designation in favor of an ex-
spouse.234 In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hillman v. Maretta, the insured 
named his then-wife as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy covered by the 
Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954.235 The insured later 
divorced the beneficiary and remarried, but he neglected to change the 
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beneficiary of the policy.236 After his death, both his current wife and his former 
wife claimed the proceeds.237 His current wife claimed that the divorce acted to 
revoke Insured’s designation of his now ex-wife as a beneficiary under Virginia 
law.238 On the other hand, his former wife asserted that local law was preempted 
by federal law, and thus the designation of her as the beneficiary remained 
effective.239 In addition, the former wife also claimed that the Virginia statute 
holding her liable for the proceeds was likewise preempted even if preemption 
occurred.240 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the Virginia statute was 
preempted and that the ex-wife was entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance 
policy.241 
E.  COMMUNITY PROPERTY SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENTS 
A community property survivorship agreement is designed to provide 
survivorship rights to community property, not to convert separate property into 
community property. Unless the agreement also meets the requirement of a 
conversion agreement, it will be ineffective to create survivorship rights in 
separate property, as demonstrated by In re Estate of Cunningham.242 A husband 
and his wife entered into a community property survivorship agreement by using 
a fill-in-the-blank form with the assistance of family members rather than an 
attorney.243 After the husband died, the trial court granted his wife’s application 
to adjudicate the agreement as valid.244 Four months later, one of the husband’s 
children (the wife’s stepson) filed a bill of review under Probate Code section 31 
claiming that the court made a substantial error because some of the property 
allegedly covered by the agreement was actually the husband’s separate 
property.245 The trial court denied the bill of review.246 
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed.247 The court explained that the 
community property survivorship agreement, although purporting to include 
“all inheritance property” within its scope, did not meet the requirements of 
Family Code sections 4.203 and 4.205 to act as a conversion of separate 
property (the inherited property) into community property which would then be 
covered by the survivorship agreement.248 For example, the agreement did not 
state that they were converting separate property into community property.249 In 
addition, there was no evidence showing that either spouse received the required 
fair and reasonable disclosure of the legal effect of converting separate property 
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to community property.250 Because the survivorship agreement did not convert 
the husband’s separate property into community property, the original order was 
substantially in error, and the trial court erred in not granting the bill of 
review.251 
F.  MCKEEHAN V. MCKEEHAN OVERRULED 
According to the Austin Court of Appeals case of McKeehan v. McKeehan, an 
agreement relating to a nonprobate asset which contains a choice of law clause 
causes that state’s law to govern the asset, such as whether the asset has the 
survivorship feature.252 The 2013 legislature added Estates Code section 
111.054 to provide that if more than 50% of that asset (e.g., a bank account, 
retirement plan, annuity, or insurance contract) was contributed by a Texas 
resident, Texas law will determine whether the asset has the survivorship feature, 
irrespective of any choice of law provision.253 The applicability of this new 
provision is based on the date of the owner’s death being on or after January 1, 
2014, rather than the date on which the decedent entered into the agreement.254 
To enhance the likelihood of a court upholding this statute, the legislature 
stated that the change represents “the fundamental policy of [Texas] for the 
protection of its residents and [is] intended to prevail over the law of another 
state or jurisdiction, to the extent those laws are in conflict with Texas law.”255 
G.  IRAS 
The 2013 Texas legislature clarified that Roth IRAs (both regular and 
inherited) are protected from creditors.256 
H.  BODY DISPOSITION 
Because a marriage is terminated only by a court decree or death, a person in 
the process of divorce needs to update his or her entire estate plan to remove the 
spouse from the normal priority the spouse has to make financial, medical, and 
body disposition arrangements.257 In re Estate of Woods demonstrates the 
importance of so doing.258 After the decedent died, a battle ensued between his 
surviving spouse and the independent executor, his son from a prior marriage, 
over who has priority to decide on the disposition of the decedent’s cremains.259 
The trial court determined the son had priority.260 
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The Tyler Court of Appeals reversed.261 The court pointed to Health & Safety 
Code section 711.002(a) which states that the surviving spouse has priority over 
body disposition if the deceased spouse did not make other arrangements.262 
The court held that it was irrelevant that decedent had filed for a divorce from 
his wife a few months before his death.263 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The new cases and legislation address a wide array of issues, some very narrow 
and some with potentially broad impact. This article has already discussed the 
practical application of the cases and statutes. It is also important to understand 
some overarching principles that transcend individual cases and statutes and 
form a pattern. Here are some examples of patterns this author detected: 
• The testator’s intent is important in will construction and courts will 
enforce and uphold provisions when the testator’s intent is clear.264 
• Timeliness and prompt action are required not only in will contests 
but in giving notice to other parties.265 
• Estate planning arrangements should be reviewed and changed 
accordingly during and after divorce to remove former spouses as 
beneficiaries or default decision makers.266 
• Courts will not “punish” without some solid basis for the 
punishment.267 
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